Sudan’s gold economy and the war it helps sustain

Sudan’s civil war is often described through front lines, air strikes and battles for major cities. Yet some of the conflict’s most important movements happen far from Khartoum, in desert mining zones where gold can be dug, traded and moved across borders with little paperwork. The metal is portable, valuable and difficult to trace once it has entered regional markets.

The war began in April 2023 when Sudan’s army, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, fought the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti. Their rivalry grew out of the failed transition after the fall of Omar al-Bashir, whose regime had empowered both military and paramilitary networks. Gold helped make those networks wealthy before the fighting started.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF do not depend on gold in exactly the same way. The RSF has long drawn revenue from mining areas and cross-border trade in Darfur, while the army has greater access to state institutions, formal export channels, banks, ports and taxation systems. These different forms of control allow both camps to turn mineral wealth into weapons, salaries, fuel and political influence.

For Australians, the issue has a direct connection to the global bullion trade. Gold mined in Sudan may pass through the United Arab Emirates and other regional hubs before reaching refiners, traders, jewellery manufacturers or investment markets. That does not mean Sudanese gold is routinely entering Australian shops or the Perth Mint, but it does show why supply-chain checks matter well beyond Africa.

Gold became a war asset before 2023

Sudan’s gold rush accelerated after the country lost much of its oil income when South Sudan became independent in 2011. Hundreds of thousands of people entered informal and semi-mechanised mining, particularly in northern and eastern Sudan, Darfur and areas along the Nile. Small pits, family operations, local financiers and larger concession holders created an economy that was difficult for the central government to regulate.

Artisanal miners often work with metal detectors, water pumps and basic crushing equipment. They sell ore or recovered gold to local dealers, who may then deal with larger traders. In remote areas, armed groups can charge access fees, impose levies, control transport routes or compel miners to sell at below-market prices. The boundary between taxation, protection and extortion is often blurred.

The state tried to bring the sector into official channels through licensing, buying offices and export rules. In practice, weak institutions and corruption encouraged smuggling. Gold could be hidden, melted into small bars or carried across porous borders into Egypt, Chad, Libya or the Central African Republic. The loss of reliable production data makes it hard to calculate how much revenue the government, military leaders and private traders actually receive.

Gold also provided a way to build independent power. Hemedti’s family and business network became closely linked to mining and trading interests, especially in Darfur. The RSF’s predecessor, the Janjaweed, had already accumulated influence through war and state-backed mobilisation in the region. Control over mines and trade routes gave the paramilitary force money that did not depend entirely on the army or the civilian government.

How the RSF turns mines and routes into revenue

The RSF’s strongest links to gold are associated with Darfur, where it and allied forces have controlled territory, checkpoints and trading corridors. Jebel Amer in North Darfur became particularly important after the RSF and allied actors expanded their influence there. The mine was formally taken over by the government in 2017, but the wider commercial and security networks surrounding Darfur’s gold remained contested.

Revenue can come from several points in the chain. Armed actors may charge miners for access, demand fees from traders, take a share of production or control the roads leading to markets. The RSF can also draw income from customs-like payments at checkpoints and from commercial companies connected to its leadership. These mechanisms are less visible than a formal mining royalty, but they can be highly effective in a fragmented war economy.

The paramilitary force has also benefited from regional relationships. Gold can move west or north through territory where state authority is weak, then enter larger trading centres. The United Arab Emirates has been identified by journalists, researchers and international officials as a major destination or transit point for Sudanese gold. Abu Dhabi has rejected accusations that it arms the RSF, while the UAE’s role remains a central subject of diplomatic and legal dispute.

Trade networks do not need to carry gold directly from a mine to a foreign buyer. Ore may be mixed with material from other sites, melted and recast, sold through intermediaries or declared under a different origin. By the time it reaches a refinery or a bullion market, the original mine may be almost impossible to establish. That is why sanctions aimed at individual commanders may have less effect when the wider commercial chain stays open.

The army’s financial system is larger and more formal

The SAF has advantages that come from being the recognised state military. It has access to official ministries, customs authorities, diplomatic channels and parts of the banking system. Since the war began, Port Sudan has served as the army-aligned administration’s temporary political and logistical centre. Control of the Red Sea coast gives the SAF influence over legal exports and imports, even when fighting continues far inland.

Army-linked companies operate across sectors including mining, manufacturing, agriculture and finance. Some are tied to the military-industrial complex built during the Bashir era. Gold can enter this structure through official buying offices, state-approved exporters and central financial institutions. The army does not need to control every mine if it can control the paperwork, export permissions, currency conversion and access to ports.

This distinction matters. A formal export may look more legitimate than gold moved through a desert convoy, but state channels are not automatically transparent. Sudan’s official statistics have been unreliable, and foreign exchange shortages create incentives for traders to avoid the official exchange rate. Gold sales can provide hard currency to purchase fuel, food, spare parts and military equipment.

The SAF has also used taxation and administrative authority in areas it controls. Local businesses may face levies, licensing demands or pressure to support the war effort. Commercial networks connected to the army can retain access to contracts and imports that are unavailable to civilians. For ordinary Sudanese, the result is a war economy in which both sides extract value from livelihoods already damaged by displacement and inflation.

The contrast with Australia is useful. A gold producer in Kalgoorlie-Boulder generally operates through mining leases, environmental approvals, payroll systems, regulated transport and audited sales. Sudan’s conflict zones lack many of those safeguards. The same mineral can therefore support a documented supply chain in Western Australia or an armed network in Darfur, depending on where and how it is produced.

Regional markets keep the metal moving

Sudan’s geography makes gold especially useful to armed groups. The country borders seven states and sits between the Sahel, the Red Sea, North Africa and the Horn of Africa. Roads across the Sahara are difficult to police, while traders have long used family, tribal and commercial links that cross colonial borders. Conflict disrupts formal trade but does not eliminate demand for a compact store of value.

The UAE has become one of the most important gold hubs in the world, and Dubai is a major destination for African gold. Researchers have documented large gaps between Sudan’s reported exports and the volumes recorded by importing countries. Such gaps can reflect smuggling, misclassification, unofficial border crossings or weaknesses in customs reporting rather than a single route controlled by one actor.

Neighbouring countries are also drawn into the trade. Egypt has economic and security interests in northern Sudan, while Chad and Libya are tied to the movement of people, fuel, weapons and commodities across the west. In the Red Sea, port access carries strategic significance for governments and foreign powers. A useful regional comparison is this analysis of Berbera’s port struggle, which shows how commercial infrastructure can become part of wider competition.

Gold is only one element in a broader conflict economy. The same routes may carry livestock, weapons, fuel, consumer goods and displaced people. Traders who once moved goods legally may start using armed escorts or informal crossings. When the war changes territorial control, prices and loyalties can shift quickly, leaving civilians to pay more for essentials while commanders capture the benefits.

For audiences in Australia, the comparison can be seen in the importance of logistics across a large country. A mine in the Pilbara or the Northern Territory depends on roads, ports, rail, insurance and export contracts. Sudan’s gold corridors also depend on logistics, but the infrastructure is contested and often protected by armed men rather than public institutions. The difference is the political risk embedded in every shipment.

Why tracing Sudanese gold is so difficult

Gold presents a special problem for responsible sourcing because it is fungible. Once refined, gold from different origins becomes chemically and commercially similar. A bar does not carry a visible record of the people who mined it, the group that taxed it or the checkpoint where it changed hands. Documentation can be forged, incomplete or created after the gold has entered a legitimate market.

The human cost is severe. Mining areas can suffer mercury contamination, unsafe pits, land disputes and forced labour. In wartime, civilians may be displaced to make room for armed groups or commercial operators. Children and vulnerable workers can become part of digging, crushing and transporting gold, while women who depend on local trading and processing lose income when violence closes markets.

Sanctions can target commanders, companies and financiers, but enforcement is uneven. A listed company may reappear under a new name, use a proxy trader or shift its transactions through another jurisdiction. Banks and refiners face the difficult task of identifying beneficial owners and verifying mine-of-origin claims. If due diligence is too weak, illicit gold is laundered through ordinary commerce; if it is too broad, legitimate artisanal miners can lose their only available market.

Australia has tools that can help, including sanctions administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, anti-money-laundering obligations overseen by AUSTRAC and corporate reporting expectations around supply chains. Australian jewellers and investors can ask whether suppliers follow recognised responsible-sourcing standards. The question is not whether every gold product can be traced perfectly, but whether a business can explain its checks and respond when credible evidence raises concerns.

The Perth Mint, the Australian Securities Exchange and local bullion dealers operate in a market where provenance, reputation and compliance affect commercial value. Australian consumers often speak of wanting a “fair go”, and that idea has a practical meaning here: miners should not be financing armed abuse simply because the final product appears clean. Responsible sourcing is a market discipline as much as an ethical statement.

What the gold war means for Sudan’s future

Gold revenue helps explain why military leaders can keep fighting after cities are destroyed and public finances collapse. It offers hard currency when banks are closed, tax collection is disrupted and international aid is restricted. It can pay soldiers and allied fighters, secure fuel and reward business networks. That reduces the pressure on commanders to accept a political settlement.

The trade also fragments authority. A central government may claim ownership of mineral resources, while local commanders, tribal leaders, dealers and foreign buyers control what happens on the ground. Each layer can take a cut. This makes peace harder because a ceasefire threatens more than military positions; it can end profitable arrangements that have emerged during the war.

A durable settlement would need to address mining governance alongside security and representation. Formalising artisanal mining without giving commanders new legal cover will be difficult. Sudan would need transparent licensing, independent monitoring, safer working conditions, fair local revenue-sharing and credible courts. Neighbouring states and international buyers would need to improve customs data and reject gold with unexplained origins.

The priority is civilian protection. People living near mines need freedom from forced labour, extortion and displacement, while miners need access to legal buyers who do not punish them for refusing armed intermediaries. International pressure should focus on the networks that profit most, rather than treating every informal miner as a criminal.

Reliable reporting matters because rumours about gold can inflame ethnic tensions and hide commercial interests behind military language. Independent outlets such as Rogue Chiefs can help place battlefield developments within the regional and economic context that fast-moving coverage often misses. For video audiences seeking wider regional reporting, regional coverage can provide another way to follow events, provided claims are checked against strong sources.

The central lesson is straightforward: Sudan’s gold is not an accidental side story to the civil war. It is part of the machinery that gives armed actors money, mobility and bargaining power. Follow the metal from mine to trader, border, refinery and buyer, and the conflict’s structure becomes easier to see.

Support careful reporting on Sudan by sharing well-sourced analysis, scrutinising the origin claims behind gold products and pressing businesses and governments for transparent supply chains. Understanding where the money comes from is one practical way to keep attention on the civilians paying for the war.